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Abstract 
Empirical descriptions of the phenomenology of meditation states rely on practitioners’ ability 
to provide accurate information on their experience. We present a meditation training 
protocol that was designed to equip naive participants with a theoretical background and 
experiential knowledge that would enable them to share their experience. Subsequently, 
novices carried on with daily practice during several weeks before participating in 
experiments. Using a neurophenomenological experiment designed to explore two different 
meditation states (focused attention and open monitoring), we found that self-reported 
phenomenological ratings (i) were sensitive to meditation states, (ii) reflected meditation 
dose and fatigue effects, and (iii) correlated with behavioral measures (variability of 
response time). Each of these effects was better predicted by features of participants’ daily 
practice than by desirable responding. Our results provide evidence that novice practitioners 
can reliably report their experience along phenomenological dimensions and warrant the 
future investigation of this training protocol with a longitudinal design.
Keywords
meditation; mindfulness; phenomenology; neurophenomenology; self-reports;  first-person; 
training; demand characteristics; desirable responding
Declarations of interest: none
Abstract 1
Keywords 1
1. Introduction 3
1.1 Theoretical context: mindfulness as a dimensional, phenomenological state 3
1.2 Epistemological limitations: Reliability of self-report data 5
1.3 Methodological issue: quality active control group 7
2 Methods 8
2.1 Participants 8
2.2 Meditation training protocol 8
2.2.1 General outline 8
2.2.2 Experiential exercises 10
2.2.3 Compliance and engagement with practice 10
2.3 Practice metrics 11
2.4 Protocol of the MEG experiment 12
2.5 Statistical analyses 13
3 Results 14
3.1 Structure of home practice 14
3.2 Efficacy of phenomenological training 14
3.2.1 Effect of states on self-reports 15
3.2.2 Predictors of the state effect on Aperture 16
3.2.3 Temporal dynamics 16
3.2.4 Predictors of the fatigue effect 17
3.2.5 Correlation with behavioral measures 18
3.2.6 Predictors of the phenomenological specificity 18
4 Discussion 20
4.1 Motivation and compliance 20
4.2 Phenomenological proficiency 21
4.3 Training and practice 23
4.4 Self-rating scales 23
4.5 Future directions 24
Ethics 25
Acknowledgements 25
References 25
Supplementary material 29
Experiential exercises implemented in the phenomenological training protocol 29
Characteristics of novices’ practice 31
Temporal dynamics of Stability and Clarity 32
Model selection for self-reported phenomenological effects 32
1. Introduction
This article aims to describe a meditation training protocol developed in the context of an 
empirical brain imaging, cross-sectional study that investigates the mechanisms of 
mindfulness and compassion meditations. The novelty of this protocol is to obtain a 
meditation active control group by training healthy, naive participants to verbally express 
their subjective experience of meditation practice using a multidimensional 
phenomenological space (Lutz et al. 2015). Phenomenological space refers here to the 
description of features of the field of experience, as it is lived and verbally expressed in the 
first person (e.g., Husserl 2008). This phenomenological matrix has been recently proposed 
as a framework to map different styles and levels of training in mindfulness, as well as 
heuristic tool to generate hypotheses for empirical research. 
The Brain & Mindfulness project attempts to practically apply this theoretical framework (for 
the study manual, see Abdoun et al. 2018). During the training participants were introduced 
to various styles of meditation practices and acquainted with phenomenological categories 
through various experiential exercises. These phenomenological dimensions were then 
investigated at neural, behavioral and physiological levels during the various cognitive and 
affective experimental paradigms. Such explicit use of first-person data to guide the analysis 
of third-person data is inspired by Francisco Varela’s research program of 
neurophenomenology (Varela 1996; Lutz & Thompson 2003). 
The current training protocol attempts to pragmatically tackle three methodological and 
conceptual challenges. The first one is concerned with issues regarding the definition of 
mindfulness meditation in psychology and cognitive neuroscience. The second one pertains 
to epistemological and methodological issues related to the integration of first-person reports 
in an experimental protocol. The third one is related to the quality of control groups for cross-
sectional studies of meditation expertise.
1.1 Theoretical context: mindfulness as a dimensional, 
phenomenological state
In experimental and clinical psychology, the construct of mindfulness is generally used with 
three different meanings that refer either to: (a) a mental trait or a dispositional inclination 
(e.g. the Five Facet of Mindfulness proposed by Baer and colleagues (2006)), (b) a 
soteriological or spiritual path conceived in therapeutic and health-promotion terms (e.g. in 
the Mindfulness-Based-Stress-Reduction program; Kabat-Zinn 1982), and (c) a single 
cognitive process trained and potentially brought to various human activities (e.g. like in 
“paying attention in a particular way: on purpose, in the present moment, and non-
judgmentally”, Kabat-Zinn 1994, p.4; or “the optimal interaction between attention and 
peripheral awareness”, Culadasa et al. 2015, p.30). While these meanings remain useful for 
many contexts, they are also problematic. Self-report questionnaires to study mindfulness as 
a trait lack specificity (Goldberg et al. 2016) and may even yield contradictory findings. For 
instance, Leigh and colleagues’ (2005) found that binge drinkers’ mindfulness scores were 
higher than those of participants in a mindfulness retreat. In addition, findings may be biased 
by social desirability, consistency effects, or shared language between intervention 
instructions and scales (see Sauer et al., 2013, Van Dam et al. 2012). Interpreting 
mindfulness as a soteriological process (meaning [b]) is often too broad to guide empirical 
research. Up to this point, discussions of mindfulness as a cognitive process (meaning [c]) 
make it difficult to account for differences in practice styles and levels of expertise, while also 
lacking the specificity required to formulate mechanistic hypotheses. Because these 
meanings are too restrictive, with C. Saron, A. Jha and J Dunne, we have argued against 
formulating a single, universally applicable consensus definition of mindfulness (Lutz et al. 
2015).  
Instead we favor reconceiving mindfulness through a family resemblance approach whereby 
it can be conceptualized as “a variety of cognitive processes embedded in a complex 
postural, aspirational, and motivational context that contribute to states that resemble one 
another along well-defined phenomenological dimensions” (Lutz et al. 2015, p.633). This 
approach draws on previous efforts to conceptualize mindfulness (Chambers et al. 2009; 
Hölzel et al. 2011; Lutz et al. 2008) and the phenomenology of mindfulness practice. It is 
compatible with multiple explanatory and analytical frameworks from different subdisciplines, 
including contemplative theories, clinical frameworks and psychological and neuroscientific 
models. This approach is guided by a pragmatic inquiry: when one is formally practicing 
mindfulness, what observable and manipulable features of consciousness are most relevant 
to report in an experimental setting? We identified seven features proposed in a bipartite 
phenomenological model (detailed in Lutz et al. 2015 and resumed here in table 1). 
PRIMARY DIMENSIONS SECONDARY DIMENSIONS
Object orientation
Sense that a mental state is oriented 
towards some object or class of objects
(e.g. perceptions, emotions)
Aperture
Broadness of the scope of attention
Clarity
Degree of vividness of the experience
Dereification
Degree to which mental phenomena are 
experienced as mental processes rather 
than accurate depictions of reality
Stability
Degree to which experience presents itself 
as enduring over time
Meta-Awareness
Extent to which the experience is under 
monitoring
Effort
Impression that one’s present mental state 
is easy or difficult to maintain
Table 1 The seven phenomenological dimensions proposed in Lutz et al. 2015. Although primary dimensions are 
presented in an orthogonal Euclidean space, they can vary independently from one another. Within this 
multidimensional space, secondary dimensions represent features dependent on specific mental states and level 
of expertise. In addition, the model assumes four general features that are common across the family of practices 
associated to mindfulness, that are physical posture, non-aversive affect, axiological framework, and task-set 
maintenance. These common general features are necessary elements of mindfulness practice, but they are not 
explicitly depicted in the model because they are less significant in distinguishing styles of practice. In the present 
manuscript, these general features will not be explicitly discussed, even if they were measured during the 
experimental settings. For instance, we measure non-aversive affect dimension during a nociceptive paradigm, 
and we interviewed after this paradigm the participants about the relationship between pain and their worldview. 
The model assumes that these dimensions of experience are dynamic and manipulable in 
that they are affected—directly or indirectly—by different instructions of practice and/or by 
the level of expertise. This model was used to plot the hypothetical phenomenological 
characteristics of two styles of mindfulness, Focused attention (FA) and Open monitoring 
(OM) meditations, for both novice and expert meditators (Lutz et al. 2015). These plots have 
been created based on various instruction sets and descriptions. They should not be taken 
as actual plots of any individual’s phenomenology. The same set of mindfulness instructions 
could be mapped to different points in the phenomenological space. This is due to individual 
differences between practitioners in the manner in which they interpret and instantiate 
instructions.
One aim of the Brain & Mindfulness project is to implement this heuristic model and to 
empirically test some of its assumptions. For instance, can we use self-report scales to 
reliably measure and monitor consistent changes in these features in response to different 
meditation instructions and training, congruent with the hypothetical plots previously 
published?
1.2 Epistemological limitations: Reliability of self-report data
A second methodological aim arises from the first one: are the empirically-obtained plots of 
the different styles and levels of expertise reliable in this phenomenological space? 
1.2.1 The reliability of self-reports
The perceived demise of early twentieth century introspectionism (Costall 2006) and the 
seminal review by Nisbett and Wilson (1977) questioned the ability of the participants to 
report the real causes of their behavior. Since then, introspective-like methods have been 
looked upon with distrust by many in the fields of psychology and cognitive science. 
Contrastingly, others have warned against drawing general conclusions from these failures. 
For example, Hurlburt and Heavey (2001) have criticized how Nisbett and Wilson’s work has 
been carelessly taken as “an unconditional refutation of introspection in general, not merely 
of the attribution of causation”, thus ignoring that “even Nisbett and Wilson recognized the 
possibility of accurate reports about inner experience” (Hurlburt and Heavey 2001, p.401).
Devising ways to detect and/or limit the diverse types of self-reports distortions is an active 
field of methodological research. For example, self-administered questionnaires have long 
included validity scales designed to this effect (Baer et al. 2003). More recently, there has 
been a renewed interest for ‘first-person methods’ to study consciousness (see the three 
special issues of the Journal of Consciousness Studies on this question: Jack and 
Roepstorff 2003, 2004; Hasenkamp and Thompson 2013). First-person methods refer to 
methods that allow an investigator to bring a participant close to their subjective experience1 
1 Such techniques were sometimes dubbed ‘second person’ methods, because they rely on the 
critical interventions of an interviewer.
(Petitmengin 2006), as well as to practices that subjects themselves can use to increase 
their sensitivity to their own experiences (Varela and Shear 1999; Depraz et al. 2003; Bitbol 
and Petitmengin 2013; Petitmengin et al. 2013).
Meditation training has been proposed as a pragmatic response to this challenge due to it's 
disciplined approach to examining experience. Approaching experience from this 
perspective allows for the refinement of first person categories' repertoire and strengthen the 
robustness of the relationship between first and third-person data (Varela 1996). However, 
this hypothesis remains to be thoroughly tested. Current available evidence includes the 
improvement of the congruence between implicit and explicit measures of self-views after 
brief mindfulness exercises (see Strick and Papies 2017 for a study on affiliation motives 
and goals, and Koole et al. 2009 for a study on self-esteem). In contrast, measures of 
interoceptive awareness based on heartbeat perception in experienced meditators have 
yielded mixed and contradictory results (Khalsa et al. 2008; Melloni et al. 2013; Bornemann 
and Singer 2017). The inconclusiveness of these studies may be due to a lack of 
methodological validity (Zamariola et al. 2018), discrepancies in the experimental designs 
and/or in the extent of bodily focus in participants’ meditation practice.  
1.2.2 Demand characteristics and desirable responding
In the context of phenomenological research on self-induced mental states (such as in 
meditation research), demand characteristics is a major source of confound that undermines 
the credibility of self-reports. Demand characteristics refer to “the totality of cues which 
convey an experimental hypothesis to the subject[s]” and which consequently “become 
significant determinants of subjects' behavior” (Orne 1962, p.779). Participants volunteering 
for scientific experiments have various motivations that may, consciously or unconsciously, 
incite them to play the role of the good participant and try to serve the experiment by 
producing the data that they think will confirm the (presumed) research hypothesis. To 
attenuate the confounding effects of demand characteristics, researchers commonly resort 
to the concealment of – if not the deception about – hypotheses, manipulations, dependent 
measures and independent variables. Another source of distortion of a participant’s behavior 
is his/her wish to present herself favorably to the experimenter, who may be perceived as an 
evaluator. This so-called social desirability bias is related to the effect of demand 
characteristics, but not identical to it (Weber and Cook 1972). To eliminate this confound, 
some researchers advocate the use of scales developed to capture individuals’ inclination to 
self-enhancement (Crown & Marlowe 1960; Paulhus 1984), as covariates in the models 
assessing the effects of interest. 
In the phenomenological study of meditation, demand characteristics lurk in the large 
overlap between the semantics of meditation instructions taught or familiar to the 
participants, and the phrasing of self-report scales aimed at measuring the 
phenomenological dimensions of interest (e.g. terms such as present-centered and 
nonjudgmental, see Van Dam et al. 2012). Consequently, the magnitude of self-reported 
phenomenological features of meditation remain overshadowed by doubt, even when shown 
to be highly specific (see for example Kok & Singer 2016). Unfortunately, the usual 
concealment strategies can hardly be applied in this context, considering that participants 
are necessarily aware of the manipulation in so far as they are asked to implement it through 
the practice of meditation.
This is not to say that all self-report results from meditation studies are inexorably 
confounded by the effect of demand characteristics. Even when demand characteristics are 
difficult to attenuate, one can look for evidence that supports an interpretation of the effect 
beyond their impact. In this study, we adopt a strategy of comparing certain factors (which 
are unaffected by demand characteristics or desirable responding) with self-reporting effects. 
We will illustrate this general approach in two ways: (i) within-subject, by testing whether 
fluctuations of phenomenological self-reports correlate with relevant behavioral measures, 
and (ii) across subjects, by testing whether participants’ amount and structure of daily 
practice predict the self-reported effects on phenomenological dimensions.
1.3 Methodological issue: quality active control group
A critical effort of the Brain & Mindfulness project was to refine the matching between the 
control group and expert meditators. This was done primarily by training novices in different 
styles of meditation practice and by familiarizing them to different phenomenological 
categories of interest. A prominent issue in the field of neuroscientific studies on mindfulness 
meditation is the relative paucity of high quality active control (Goldberg et al. 2017). This 
issue has been repeatedly raised and suggestions of improvement have been discussed in 
the context of longitudinal studies (Davidson and Kaszniak 2015; Kuyken et al. 2016). 
However, cross-sectional studies with long term practitioners have received less 
methodological attention. In such studies, an active control group is often lacking or too 
basic when present. Of the nineteen independent cross-sectional studies on the 
neurofunctional effects of long term meditation in a recent meta-analysis (Fox et al. 2016), 
only seven included an active control2. In six of these studies, meditation-naive participants 
received written and/or oral instructions and were encouraged to sustain a daily practice for 
7 to 10 days until the moment of the experiment. In the remaining study, participants 
received a brief training session by an experienced teacher on the day of the experiment 
(Kalyani et al. 2011). These approaches, while clearly better than not including an active 
control group, have several limitations. First, limited possibility for feedback or the lack of 
guidance by an experienced and qualified instructor induces a high risk of misinterpretations 
and inadequate implementations of the practices. Second, the short duration of the training 
limits the opportunities to engage with the practice. Here we addresses some of these issues 
by: 1) formally training meditation-naive participants in practices from the same meditation 
background as the long-term practitioners, 2) letting this training be provided by a qualified 
instructor in a context with attention to sufficient opportunity for guided practice and 
feedback, and 3) encouraging participants to maintain a daily practice at home for a 
minimum of 20 minutes a day for an extended duration (6 to 22 weeks depending on the 
availability of participants and experimental resources). We contend that these adaptations 
make it more likely for participants to reach a refined understanding of the various practices 
and experiential dimensions at hand. This training has the potential of reducing the risk that 
any group differences  are merely driven by confounding factors (e.g. misunderstanding 
practices and/or unfamiliarity with meditation terminology for novices but not experts), 
instead of reflecting the true effect of interest, i.e. meditation expertise. 
2 One study by Lutz et al. (2009) included samples from two other studies in the meta-analysis and 
was not taken into account.  We excluded studies on yoga and chanting.
We will first report the specifics of our meditation training protocol. Then we will provide 
empirical evidence for its effectiveness in teaching meditation-naive participants to use first-
person categories to describe their conscious experience and discriminate between 
phenomenological dimensions. 
2 Methods
2.1 Participants
The first stage of the research included a meditation training weekend comprising of 42 
healthy participants naive to meditation. These individuals were recruited for their interest to 
learn meditation and their willingness to sustain a regular practice for several months. After a 
preliminary inclusion procedure (see study manual for details, Abdoun et al. 2018), 
participants were invited to attend a weekend-long training program in the Lyon 
Neuroscience Research Center. The program looked to support participants in developing a 
refined understanding of the states of consciousness involved in the following experimental 
study.
The expert group was comprised of 30 healthy long-term practitioners with more than 10,000 
hours of formal meditation in their life and trained in the Kagyü and Nyingma schools of 
Tibetan Buddhism.
Both novices and experts participated in up to 8 experimental sessions (see study manual 
for details, Abdoun et al. 2018). For expert participants, these experimental sessions were 
gathered in 2 visits of 3 days, or a single visit of 6 days. For novice participants, each visit 
comprised 1 or 2 experimental sessions, and the visits were spread over a period spanning 
from 2 to 23 weeks after the training weekend. Visits were scheduled according to 
participants’ and equipment (MRI, MEG, EEG) availabilities, leading to a large but quasi-
random variability across the novice group in time elapsed between the training and the 
experiment.
Among all participants, 25 trained novice practitioners and 25 expert practitioners 
participated in the MEG experiment described below. The remaining participants included in 
the larger study were excluded for the MEG experiment because of excessive signal artifacts 
caused by dental prostheses. The novice and expert groups for the MEG experiment did not 
differ in gender (16 and 15 males, respectively; χ2(1)=.08), age (53.9±7.1 and 51.6±8.0 
years, respectively; independent t-tests t=.84) and education (3.88±2.15 and 3.20±2.16 
years of higher education, respectively; independent t-tests t=.46).
2.2 Meditation training protocol
2.2.1 General outline
The training protocol was based on Joy of Living (Rinpoche & Swanson 2007; Tergar 2018), 
a secular meditation program aimed at Western audiences authored by Yongey Mingyur 
Rinpoche, a renowned master of Karma Kagyü and Nyingma schools of Tibetan Buddhism. 
This program was selected for its shared background with experts’ training. In its original 
format, the program is divided into three stages, each lasting two days; in addition, there are 
minimal practice requirements to attend stages 2 and 3. For our training protocol, we drew 
from the material of stages 1 and 2, condensing them in a two-day format, and included 
adaptations to emphasize the specific dimensions of experience of interest to the research 
program. 
The training was provided by a qualified instructor with thirteen years of practice under the 
guidance of Mingyur Rinpoche, and eight years of teaching experience with the Joy of Living 
program. The training included teachings with the support of instruction videos, guided 
meditations and experiential exercises, question and answer sessions, as well as sufficient 
time to reflect and share within the group. 
The training allowed a basic understanding of a few selected phenomenological dimensions 
eligible for an active comparison with expert practitioners. In particular, the program 
introduced participants to the following dimensions: effort, aperture, absorption vs. 
meditative awareness, foreground vs. background awareness, equanimity, clarity (see table 
1 and supplementary materials). The discernment of these dimensions was implemented by 
introducing the lived phenomenology of these states and creating occasions for a direct 
exploration of them. To access both the experience and the meaning of meditation the 
teacher devised specific exercises with connected theoretical principles. As a sommelier 
apprentice does in tasting, savoring, comparing and sampling different wines under the 
guidance of a sommelier, participants were invited to learn, practice and distinguish few 
states of consciousness under the guidance of a meditation teacher in order to become 
progressively familiar with some meditative phenomenological dimensions commonly 
described in contemplative traditions. 
The training followed a specific day program (table 2) which will be briefly described here. 
In day 1, participants were first introduced to the notion of mental ‘effort’ in meditation 
through an experiential exercise that involved listening to sounds. The rest of the day was 
spent exploring the concepts of ‘absorption and meditative awareness’. This exercise was 
done first by using the breath as an anchor for meditative awareness. Participants were 
asked to restrict their attention to the breath, to notice when their mind had wandered, and to 
return their attention to the breath when this happened. Later during the day, they were also 
asked to gradually explore more open forms of awareness, by opening up to sense 
experiences from the environment (e.g. sounds and vision). While doing so, participants also 
engaged in two other experiential exercises that introduced the concepts of ‘object 
orientation and aperture’ and ‘foreground and background awareness’.
At the beginning of day 2, participants continued to explore meditative awareness of the 
environment with various exercises including a walking meditation in open awareness. Then 
the instructor asked participants to form small groups and share their personal experience of 
the weekend. After some time, the small groups gathered to share collectively the problems 
and difficulties which had emerged, so that the teacher could provide adequate feedback. 
Then the concepts of ‘empathy and compassion’ were introduced and the teacher asked 
participants to briefly cultivate feelings of self-compassion. After lunch, participants engaged 
in an exercise that involved switching between focused attention on, and open monitoring of, 
pain. The rest of the afternoon was spent further elucidating concepts of empathy and 
compassion, including an experiential exercise that presented images of people’s suffering 
to participants. Finally, during the closing meditation session, the importance of the intention 
to practice was discussed and emphasized. Participants were asked to fully engage in their 
own practice.
DAY 1 DAY 2
9:30 – 10:30
Meditative awareness
11:00 – 12:00
Effort in perception and attention (on a sound)
Absorption vs. Meditative awareness 
(introduction) BREAK
12:00 – 13:00
Absorption vs. Meditative awareness
(on the breath)
10:45 – 12:30
Group discussion
Empathy vs. Compassion (introduction)
BREAK BREAK
14:30 – 15:30
Absorption vs. Meditative awareness
(on the breath)
14:00 – 15:45
Focused Attention & Open Monitoring (on pain)
Empathy vs. Compassion (images)
BREAK BREAK
16:30 – 17:30
Focused Attention & Open Monitoring
Object orientation & Aperture
Background & Foreground
16:00 – 17:00
Closing meditation (intention do practice)
Presentation of the research project
Instructions for home practice
Table 2. Program of the training weekend.
2.2.2 Experiential exercises
Throughout the training weekend, subjects were prompted to familiarize themselves with the 
dimensions of subjective experience that were going to be of interest in the neuroscientific 
experiments. This familiarization was carried out by using experiential exercises. During 
each exercise, a dimension or process was introduced in a more or less explicit form. Some 
dimensions were experienced and described in the context of guided meditation sessions 
and teachings, while other exercises were implemented with the specific aim of familiarizing 
subjects with a phenomenological dimension. We refer the reader to the Supplementary 
Materials for a full description of these exercises.
At the end of the weekend, subjects received a document that briefly described each 
phenomenological dimension and reminded them how it was introduced by corresponding 
exercises during the weekend.
2.2.3 Compliance and engagement with practice
The minimal goal of the training weekend was to give novice participants sufficient 
understanding and confidence to carry on practice autonomously, thus deepening their 
familiarity with the practices under study.
At the end of the weekend, participants received an explanation of what was expected of 
them in terms of homework practice. Participants were advised to practice for 20 to 30 
minutes on a daily basis and to give equal importance to each of the three practices they 
had learned. In addition, they were asked to report the type and amount of practice in a 
practice logbook that was provided at the end of the meditation training weekend. In order to 
ensure truthful reports, participants were assured that non-compliance to these 
recommendations would not call into question their participation to the study. 
Participants were provided with three 15 minute-long audio recordings of guided meditations 
by their instructor to aid their practice (one recording for each of the three meditative 
practices). However, they were strongly encouraged to avoid relying exclusively on them and 
to get used to meditating unguided. Participants were also given excerpts from the book Joy 
of Living, summarizing most of the teachings received during the weekend: the physical 
posture, the mental attitude, as well as various meditative and experiential exercises 
examined during the weekend (Rinpoche & Swanson 2007). 
2.3 Practice metrics 
Four metrics were used to assess participants’ home practice and degree of engagement: 
the proportion of days involving practice (hereafter referred to as Frequency of practice or 
simply Frequency); the average amount of practice during days with practice (hereafter, 
Session length); the daily average amount of practice, all days included (Intensity of practice 
or simply Intensity); and the total amount of practice (Experience)3. Figure 1 describes how 
these four metrics relate to each other and how they were derived from the data contained in 
the practice logbooks. These metrics were also explored in relation to phenomenological 
ratings and behavioral measures from the experiments.
In addition, we calculated an index of balance between focus and open styles of practice, the 
Focus/Open Balance Index (hereafter referred to as FOB) for each participant. FOB is 
defined as the absolute difference between OM practice and FA practice, normalized by the 
sum of the two4:
1 ‒
|𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑒(𝐹𝐴) ‒ 𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑒(𝑂𝑀)|
𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑒(𝐹𝐴 + 𝑂𝑀)
3 Capitals are used to distinguish these terms from their common definitions.
4 Note that for the calculation of FOB, using Intensity or Experience as measures of practice produce 
exactly the same result because, for each participant, Intensity is equal to Experience divided by a 
time factor (the number of days between the training week-end and the experiment). This factor would 
be cancelled out in the ratio present in the formula of FOB.
Fig. 1 Four interrelated metrics were used to assess commitment to home practice. 
2.4 Protocol of the MEG experiment
One major purpose of the meditation course undertaken by novice participants was to train 
them in using phenomenological categories of interest in the study. In order to validate that 
they understood these categories as intended and used them appropriately, we analyzed the 
self-report data from a magnetoencephalographic (MEG) experiment with a hierarchical 
repeated measure design that included several periods of FA and OM meditations, along 
with a control (resting-state, RS) period (fig. 2). 
The experiment started with a staircase visual threshold calibration for a visual task whose 
detailed procedure and results are irrelevant for the present article but will be described in 
another publication. Following the calibration, we recorded a 7 minute baseline period. Then, 
participants practiced FA and OM twice each, in sequences of approximately 24 minutes 
(figure 2a). Each sequence opened with a 7 minute-long block of meditation only, during 
which participants were presented with a 1.5°-wide white dot in the middle of a black screen 
(figure 2b). The instruction was to keep the gaze steady on the white dot; in FA, participants 
were additionally instructed to use that disk as a support for the attention. This first block 
was followed by three blocks lasting approximately 5.5 minutes each, during which 
participants were instructed to maintain the meditative state while performing a simple visual 
conscious report task using a threshold stimulus embedded in a passive visual oddball 
paradigm (figure 2c). After each block, participants were invited to rate their experience over 
6 different dimensions, using a 7-point Likert-type item (figure 2d): Capacity to apply the 
meditation instructions, Stability of the mind, Clarity of the mind, Aperture of the field of 
awareness (see table 1 for definitions), Awareness of bodily sensations, and Wakefulness. 
Here we will limit our analysis to the dimensions featured in the phenomenological matrix: 
Stability, Clarity and Aperture5. Rating scales were thus introduced: “Compared to your usual 
experience, how would you rate the last block in terms of Stability/Clarity/Aperture?” 
Fig. 2 The neurophenomenological experiment MIMOSA, the self-report data of which is used in the current 
article. A. Hierarchical structure of the experiment. After an initial resting state period (RS), the experiment was 
divided into 2 sessions, with a 5 to 20 minute break in between. Each session was divided into 2 sequences: one 
of FA (focused attention) and one of OM (open monitoring), presented in a randomized order. Therefore, there 
were 4 different combinations for the state order across the experiment: FA-OM-FA-OM (illustrated here), OM-
FA-OM-FA, FA-OM-OM-FA, OM-FA-FA-OM; state order was counterbalanced across each group of participants. 
Each sequence consisted of 4 blocks: a first 7 minute block of “meditation only” (block 0) followed by three ~6 
minute long blocks of “meditation + task” with dynamic stimuli (blocks 1-2-3). During the "meditation only", a white 
disk was displayed on a black background and participants were instructed to either use it as a support of their 
attention (in the case of FA) or to maintain their gaze on it (in OM blocks). During subsequent blocks, participants 
had to maintain the state induced in block 0, while going through 41 trials of a visual conscious report task. B. 
One trial of the task. During the task, a black-and-colored checkerboard was continuously displayed at the center 
of the screen. Each trial consisted of a series of checkerboard reversals, the last color of which was 
systematically deviant from the previous ones of the series (passive color oddball paradigm). A trial lasted 3 to 7 
reversals. In 36 of the 41 trials, a Gabor patch set at threshold contrast was flashed for 50ms, any time between 
the second and the last reversal. At the end of the trial, a question mark prompted the participant to report 
whether they had consciously seen it or not. C. After each of the 17 blocks of the experiment, participants rated 6 
different dimensions of their experience using a Likert item.
2.5 Statistical analyses
Statistical modeling and inference. ANOVAs were of type 2. Post hoc tests were performed 
using one- or two-sample t-tests, adjusted for family-wise multiple comparison using Tukey’s 
honestly significant difference (HSD) method. One-sample and paired two-sample tests were 
performed using the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank test. Linear mixed models were 
5 Just like for practice metrics, capitals are used for phenomenological dimensions to distinguish the 
terms from their common definitions.
fitted using maximum likelihood and significance of fixed effects were evaluated using the 
likelihood ratio test. All linear regressions were ordinary least square (OLS) regressions.
Correlation between scale ratings and variability of response times. Outlier trials were 
defined as trials for which response times were not within 3 standard deviations from the 
mean value, for each participant, state and response type (yes/no), and excluded. An index 
of RT variability was defined for each block as the standard deviation of RTs. Finally, we 
computed for each participant the Pearson correlation coefficient between Stability ratings 
and RT variability. We did the same with Clarity. Correlation coefficients were z-transformed 
for the purpose of statistical modeling and are noted z hereafter. The data from one subject 
was removed because it had no variance in the Clarity scale (the subject responded 6 in all 
blocks).
Model selection for multiple regression analyses. For each of the effects related to 
phenomenological rating scores, we considered several potential predictors: metrics of home 
practice (Intensity, Experience and the balance between focus and open styles of practice), 
and an index of desirable responding (the score to the Balanced Inventory of Desirable 
Responding, BIDR). Practice data was missing for one participant, who was therefore 
excluded from subsequent analyses. We used an information-based model selection to 
determine the most important predictors for our data (Burnham and Anderson 2002). Model 
selection is well suited to multiple regression analysis when the number of predictors is high 
compared to the number of data points; in addition, it virtually guarantees that no potential 
effect of interest is missed, as long as it is included in the variable set. We performed model 
selection in 2 steps, using glmulti for R (Calcagno and de Mazancourt 2010). Firstly, we 
fitted all possible models that contained a subset of the predictors mentioned above and 
their two-way interactions, and that satisfied the marginality constraint (i.e. included all 
interaction terms as main effects). We used the corrected Akaike information criteria (AICc) 
as a measure of the quality of fit, because it is well adapted to small sample sizes (Hurvich 
and Tsai 1989). Secondly, we selected models that were within 2 information criteria (IC) 
units of the best fitting model (Burnham and Anderson 2002) for further consideration. 
Detailed results of the model selection output are presented in the Supplementary Materials. 
These include the relative evidence weight, a measure of relative importance of each term 
across the entire model space (Calcagno and de Mazancourt 2010), comprised between 0 
and 1.
3 Results
3.1 Structure of home practice
The total duration of participation to the entire study ranged from 41 to 163 days (99.4 ± 31.4 
days) after the training weekend. Average daily practice (= Intensity) ranged from 1.3 to 30.5 
minutes (15.9 ± 7.3 minutes; supplementary fig. 1a, top left), suggesting that many 
participants fell short of the recommended amount of practice (20 to 30 minutes a day). 
However, when average daily practice was calculated over the number of days with at least 
some practice (rather than all days), the obtained Session length was found to range from 
14.0 to 33.1 minutes (21.2 ± 5.5 minutes; supplementary fig. 1a, bottom right). Participants 
dedicated 45.2 ± 16.8% of their practice time to OM (Open Monitoring), 33.4 ± 17.5% to FA 
(Focused Attention) and 21.4 ± 9.8% to CO (Compassion). A one-way repeated measure 
ANOVA revealed a significant difference between the proportion of time dedicated to the 
different practices (F(2,80)=16.95, p<.0001, η²=.30). Post hoc paired t-tests revealed that all 
comparisons of pairs of practices were significant (supplementary fig. 1b).
Intensity of practice decreased linearly over weeks (supplementary fig. 2a; R²adj=.87, p<.001, 
β=-.44, 95% CI [-.53,-.35]). A large portion of this drop (80.9%) is imputable to a sharp 
decline of Frequency of practice over weeks (supplementary fig. 2b; R²adj=.92, p<.001, β=-
.14, 95% CI [-.16,-.12]). The remaining 19.1% is due to a slight shortening of practice 
sessions (supplementary fig. 2c; R²adj=.22, β=-.10, 95% CI [-.18,-.01]). Taken together, these 
results show that participants managed to follow the recommendation of 20-to-30 minute-
long practice sessions throughout the study, but failed to practice on a daily basis and were 
increasingly inclined to skip days.
3.2 Patterns in self-reports and relationships to practice
We tested three predictions that should be verified if the phenomenological self-reports are 
reliable. We examined whether the responses of the novices to the rating scales in the MEG 
experiment i) were sensitive to the meditation state, in a way consistent with the known 
phenomenology of mindfulness practices (Lutz et al. 2015), ii) exhibited classic temporal 
dynamics such as dose and fatigue effects, and iii) were functionally informative, as would 
be suggested by correlations with behavioral measures.
In each instance, we tested whether desirable responding and/or features of participants’ 
home practice predicted the effects observed on self-reports. The results are summarized in 
table 3.
3.2.1 Effect of states on self-reports
In the phenomenological model introduced in Lutz et al. 2015, Stability and Clarity are 
described as secondary qualities that are both increased when practicing either FA and OM 
(compared to mind-wandering), and even more so with expertise. In contrast, Aperture is 
hypothesized to increase specifically during the practice of OM. 
In order to test this prediction, we modeled the ratings per scale using a two-way ANOVA 
model with state (RS, FA, OM) as a within-subject factor and group (novices, experts) as a 
between-subjects factor (fig. 3). For Aperture, we found a main effect of state 
(F(2,96)=19.54, p<0.001, =.15). Post-hoc t-tests showed that there was no significant 𝜂2𝐺
difference between RS and FA (p>.32), while Aperture was reported significantly higher in 
OM than in FA and RS (p<.0001). For both Stability and Clarity, a small-to-medium state-by-
group interaction was found (F(2,96)=5.19, p=.007, =.027, and F(2,96)=10.22, p<.001, 𝜂2𝐺 𝜂2𝐺
=.045, respectively). Further post-hoc t-tests showed that experts’ ratings differed 
significantly in both dimensions between the control condition and each of the two meditation 
states (all p<.0001), but not between FA and OM (both p>.92). In contrast, there was no 
difference in neither Stability nor Clarity, across the 3 conditions, in the novice group (all 
p>.24). To summarize, participants’ ratings corroborated the hypothesized 
phenomenological pattern in the expert group for all three secondary dimensions tested, but 
only for Aperture in novices.
Fig. 3 Effects of meditation states on three dimensions of experience reported by the participants. Both novice 
and expert groups reported greater Aperture of the attentional field during OM compared to RS and FA. Experts 
also reported greater Stability and Clarity during meditation compared to RS, but not novices. All ratings were 
given on a scale ranging from 1 to 7. RS: resting-state; FA: focused attention; OM: open monitoring. Errors bars 
are 95% confidence intervals. Significance levels: *: p<.05; **: p<.01; ***: p<.001; ****: p<.0001
3.2.2 Predictors of the state effect on Aperture
When participants are asked to rate the broadness of their attentional scope (i.e. Aperture) in 
two different meditation states referred to as “focus attention” and “open presence”, the fact 
that the expected response lies in the very names of the state conditions can hardly remain 
unnoticed. Thus, we cannot exclude the possibility that participants’ responses were 
influenced by their willingness to please the experimenter, and/or to show that they have 
correctly understood the meditation instructions.
Another, non-trivial hypothesis is that novice participants develop the ability to differentiate a 
state of focus attention and a state of broader awareness by getting equally familiar with 
both attentional styles. Said otherwise, we expect participants who have had more practice 
in OM than in FA to have more ease opening (or more difficulty narrowing) their attentional 
scope than participants who have developed an equal familiarity of the two styles of practice. 
As a result, we would expect the latter to better differentiate FA and OM on the Aperture 
scale than the former. The same reasoning can be straightforwardly applied, mutatis 
mutandis, to participants who favored FA over OM. We explored the plausibility of this 
hypothesis by testing whether our data were coherent with the ensuing predictions. We 
included an index of balance between FA and OM (FOB), along with other practice metrics 
(Intensity and Experience) and an index of desirable responding (BIDR) in the set of 
variables tested for model selection (see 2.5 Methods, Statistical analyses).
Three models survived the model selection procedure: the best one included a significant 
FOB-by-Experience interaction (model A1), while the other two contained a significant FOB-
by-Intensity interaction (models A2 and A3; see details in supplementary table 1). BIDR was 
not present in any of these models, and its evidence across all models was found relatively 
low (.31). The FOB-by-Experience interaction had a higher evidence across model space 
than the FOB-by-Intensity interaction (.55 and .31, respectively). To illustrate how the 
balance between focus and open styles of practice interacts with the amount of practice, we 
performed a Johnson-Neyman post-hoc analysis of the interaction in model A1, using FOB 
as a predictor and Experience as a moderator. We found that for participants who had 
accumulated more than 23.9 hours of practice, the FOB index positively predicts (p<.05) the 
self-reported difference in Aperture between FA and OM during the MEG experiment (see 
supplementary figure 3).
Considering that all our participants except one practiced OM more than FA at home, a 
higher FOB could have been entirely driven by FA practice in our dataset. Thus, the FOB-by-
Experience interaction could actually hide an effect of Experience in FA only, which would 
lead to a very different interpretation of our results6. To test this alternative explanation, we 
fitted a model with Experience in FA as a single regressor, as well as a model that also 
included Intensity as a regressor. None of them was found significant (p>.98 and p>.16 
respectively). We repeated this analysis with Experience in OM instead of FA – again, 
neither model was significant (p>.84 and p>.22, respectively).
To summarize, the results of our model selection analysis and post hoc tests are consistent 
with the hypothesis that equal familiarity with focus and open attentional states, rather than 
experience in any specific practice, drives the ability to differentiate between states.
3.2.3 Temporal dynamics
The absence of effect on self-reported Stability and Clarity in novices over the experiment 
does not necessarily rule out the possibility that novice participants used these categories 
appropriately and informatively. For example, averaging ratings over the entire experiment 
could have occluded temporal effects. This is indeed what we have observed in our data 
(supplementary figure 4). We used linear mixed models to account for the nested nature of 
the MEG experiment structure (blocks within sequences within sessions). The models 
included all possible interactions in fixed effects, as well as random subjects’ intercepts and 
by-subject random slopes across blocks, sequences and sessions. We used two models: 
one for Stability ratings and one for Clarity ratings. In both models, we found an effect of 
block on ratings only for the first sequence of each session (i.e. sequences 1 and 3; cf. fig. 2; 
Stability: χ2(3)=8.58, p=.035; Clarity: χ2(3)=7.85, p=.049), suggesting that the middle break 
had some sort of resetting effect. Post-hoc pairwise t-tests revealed a significant decrease of 
ratings from blocks 1 to 3 in sequences 3 and 4 (Stability: Δ=.62, 95% CI [.19, 1.05], p<.002; 
6 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this alternative interpretation.
Clarity: Δ=.43, 95% CI [.09, .77], p<.007; all other p>.1), but no pairwise differences in other 
sequences (all p>.5). 
3.2.4 Predictors of the fatigue effect
The decrease of self-reported Stability and Clarity in novices after four blocks (~ 24 minutes) 
of meditation may reflect fatigue. This is not surprising considering that most novices were 
not used to meditating for more than approximately 20 minutes during their daily home 
practice (see supplementary fig. 1a). A corollary of this interpretation is that the longer and 
more frequently the participants were used to meditate, the less likely they should be to 
experience fatigue in the context of the experiment. We tested this prediction by modeling a 
fatigue index, defined for each participant as the difference between their ratings in block 3 
and block 1 of sequence 17, averaged over the dimensions of Stability and Clarity. Five 
models were selected (supplementary table 2). Intensity was present in 2 of them as a main 
effect, and in 2 others in interaction with BIDR. Surprisingly, FOB was present as a main 
effect in 4 out of the 5 selected models. Across all models, FOB and Intensity had the 
highest relative weighted evidence (.74 and .66, respectively) closely followed by BIDR (.60). 
The fact that FOB was found as important as Intensity suggests that the mitigating effect of 
practice Intensity on Fatigue is driven by the level of engagement in a specific style of 
practice. To explore this idea, we performed a second model selection where we replaced 
Intensity and FOB by the two subcomponents of Intensity: IntensityFA and IntensityOM, 
corresponding to the two styles of practice. For the sake of parsimony, we also removed 
Experience, which was already found to be of low importance. The only selected model from 
this new variable space had a single regressor, IntensityFA (p=.034, β=.085, 95% CI [.007, 
.162]; supplementary table 3).
7 The same analysis based on combined data from sequences 1 and 3 leads to the same 
conclusions.
Fig. 4 Evolution of self-reported Stability and Clarity in novices during the four blocks of the first meditation 
sequence. (a) There was a two-stage temporal pattern; namely, a boost of Stability from block 0 to block 1 
(Δ=.64, 95% CI [.03, 1.25], p=.036), followed by fatigue in subsequent blocks (Stability: Δ=-.68, 95% CI [-1.29, -
.07], p=.023; Clarity: Δ=-.68, 95% CI [-1.20, -.16], p=.005). Ratings of the RS block are indicated in grey next to 
block 0. (b) This fatigue effect was reduced in those novices who engaged the most in focus (left) but not in open 
(right) styles of meditation. Errors bars are 95% confidence intervals. Significance levels: *: p<.05; **: p<.01
3.2.5 Correlation with behavioral measures
Previous studies have reported intra-individual variability of performance (most notably 
response times) as a good predictor of whether the participant is on-task at a given moment 
or not (Bastian and Sackur 2013; Seli et al. 2013). Based on this literature, we predicted that 
self-reported Stability, but not other dimensions, would be significantly correlated to 
variability of response times at the level of individual participants. We chose Clarity as a 
control dimension, for its similar pattern of sensitivity to state and group (see fig. 3).
One sample Wilcoxon signed rank tests of z-transformed within-subject Pearson correlation 
coefficients against zero show that the RT variability correlated negatively with Stability (z=-
.26, 95% CI [-.40, -.12], p<.0003) as expected, but also with Clarity (z=-.14, 95% CI [-.28, -
.003, p=.046) (fig. 5a, left). However, a two-sample paired test between zstability and zclarity was 
found significant (p=0.041). Thus, even though self-reported ratings of Stability and Clarity 
were strongly correlated within subjects (Wilcoxon signed rank test on z-transformed 
correlation coefficients: z=.77, 95%CI [.62, .94], p<.0001), the association with RT variability 
was significantly stronger for Stability than for Clarity. This suggests that although the 
phenomenological dimensions of Stability and Clarity tend to fluctuate naturally together, 
novices are able to differentiate them functionally in their reports, just like experts (fig. 5a, 
right). In order to further assess the specificity of these findings, we repeated the same 
analysis using mean RT (instead of RT variability). We found that neither Stability nor Clarity 
correlated significantly with mean RT (both p>0.1).
3.2.6 Predictors of the phenomenological specificity
Based on these results, we further hypothesized that this fine differentiation could have been 
implicitly trained in our novice group through the practice of meditation. Indeed, the reflexive 
quality cultivated in contemplative practices is expected to improve one’s familiarity with the 
specific phenomenal characteristics of different experiential dimensions. To test this 
prediction, we defined an index of phenomenological specificity as the difference between 
zstab, the z-transformed Pearson correlation coefficient between Stability ratings and RT 
variability, and zclar, the analogue measure for Clarity ratings. Only one model survived 
selection (supplementary table 4), and it contained a single regressor, Experience (p=.023, 
β=-0.011, 95% CI [-.021, -.002]; fig. 5b). Across all models, Experience had by far the 
highest evidence weight (.84). 
Following the suggestion of a reviewer, we further explored whether Experience in particular 
practices drove phenomenological specificity. We performed a second model selection using 
the amount of Experience in each practice (FA, OM and CO) and the 2-way interactions 
between these 3 variables (to model for potential synergies between practices). Three 
models were selected from this new variable space (supplementary table 5). All of them 
included ExperienceOM as a regressor but no interactions whatsoever. ExperienceOM had by 
far the highest evidence weight (.91), while ExperienceFA and ExperienceCO were on par (.44 
and .49 respectively).
Fig. 5 Self-reports from novices appear to be functionally relevant. (a) The variability of response time correlates 
negatively with self-reported stability. In novice participants, it also correlates negatively with clarity, but 
significantly less so, indicating that these two dimensions are properly differentiated by novices. (b) Functional 
differentiation of stability and clarity was higher in those novice participants with the highest amount of practice 
(right), while intensity of practice was not a reliable predictor (left). Errors bars are 95% confidence intervals. 
Significance levels: *: p<.05; **: p<.01; ***: p<.001
Predictors’ evidence
across model space
DV Interpretation Level of DC BIDR Practice
𝑎𝑝𝑟𝑂𝑀 ‒ 𝑎𝑝𝑟𝐹𝐴 Discrimination of states strong .31 .55 FOB x Experience
𝑠𝑡𝑏3 ‒ 𝑠𝑡𝑏1
2 +
𝑐𝑙𝑟 ‒ 𝑐𝑙𝑟1
2
Fatigue moderate .40 .74 Intensityfocus
𝑧𝑅𝑇𝑉,𝑠𝑡𝑏 ‒ 𝑧𝑅𝑇𝑉,𝑐𝑙𝑟
Discrimination of 
phenomenological 
dimensions
none .23 .84 Experience
Table 3 Summary of experimental results on self-reports of phenomenological dimensions during meditation 
states. All reported effects (discrimination of states, fatigue and discrimination of phenomenological dimensions) 
were associated to specific aspects of participants’ home practice. The importance of desirable responding score 
as a predictor was never higher than practice. DV: dependent variable; DC: demand characteristics; BIDR: 
Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding; FA: focused attention; OM: open monitoring; FOB: focus/open 
practice balance index; Stb: Stability; Clr: Clarity; Apr: Aperture; RTV: response time variability.
4 Discussion   
We described a meditation training protocol intended for naive candidates with no prior 
experience of meditation. We designed this protocol out of the need for a high-quality control 
group for a neurophenomenological study on the effects of meditation state and expertise in 
meditation on brain, behavior and physiology. The aim of the training was twofold: 1) to 
provide participants with sufficient background knowledge and direct experience with three 
types of meditations so that they could sustain a regular practice for an extended period of 
time, and be comfortable to practice in the laboratory context for the experimental tasks of 
the study; 2) to establish a common ground of relevant phenomenological categories with 
the participants, in order to allow them to report their experience during meditation states 
reliably.
Overall we found evidence that the phenomenological training was successful in the sense 
that participants’ self-reports: i) were reliable and sensitive to the meditation state 
manipulation, ii) exhibited expected temporal dynamics such as dose and fatigue effects, 
and iii) were functionally informative; in addition each of these effects was more strongly 
predicted by the amount and structure of participants’ practice than by desirable responding 
as indexed by the BIDR questionnaire. 
  
4.1 Motivation and compliance
In meditation research, motivation is often discussed for its potential confounding effect that 
limits the interpretability of longitudinal studies (Eberth & Sedlmeier 2012). On the other 
hand, motivation of novice control participants can be considered a strength for the cross-
sectional study of expertise as expert meditators, in so far as they dedicate a large of 
amount of time and resources to their training and practice, are expected to have strong 
motivation. Our study was highly demanding for the novices, as they had to engage in daily 
practice and participate in 6 to 8 experimental sessions over the course of several months. 
This, along with the multi-step recruitment procedure, acted as a filter for motivation. 
The high level of motivation of the novice participants was reflected in the satisfactory level 
of commitment to the practice maintained throughout their participation to the study. Three 
months after their training, they were still accomplishing more than half of the prescribed 
amount of practice, in the absence of any reminders or booster sessions. This even though 
they were assured that dropping the practice would remain without consequences for their 
participation to the study and financial compensation. This laxity given to participants, while 
having the effect of revealing their intrinsic motivation, is not without shortcomings. 
Compassion meditation, for example, was largely neglected. This might be related to the 
dense set-up of our initiation program, which attempted to train the participants in three 
different forms of meditation in just two consecutive days. In contrast, the original Joy of 
living program on which the training was based requires that practitioners first engage in 6 
months of regular practice before they can receive teachings on compassion. However, this 
shortcoming has limited consequences for our study as the goal was primarily to get 
participants accustomed to the concept and practice of compassion and sensitize them to its 
difference with empathic resonance.
A large majority (75%) of participants favored the practice of OM at home. This may come as 
a surprise considering that in many Buddhist contemplative traditions, OM practices are 
considered more advanced and are approached only after some training in FA (Lutz et al. 
2008). However, this bias towards OM is consistent with the deliberate stance adopted by 
Mingyur Rinpoche, author of the Joy of living program, whereby one is invited to enter the 
field of open awareness from the outset.
4.2 Phenomenological proficiency
During their training, novice participants were introduced to phenomenological categories 
with the help of practical, experiential exercises. Using rating scales and behavioral data 
from one of the experiments to which they later participated, we have described three effects 
that can be interpreted as reflecting an effect of practice, phenomenal training, or both. 
Based on both a priori considerations and control for desirable responding, we have 
systematically assessed the potential confounding effect of demand characteristics and 
found limited support for it. We review the evidence (see also table 3) and discuss other 
potential alternate interpretations below.
First, novice participants reported greater Aperture in OM compared to FA, just like experts, 
suggesting that they were able to distinguish the two practices. In addition, their responses 
on the Aperture scale was not driven by their diligence in any specific meditation style, but 
rather by the overall structure of their practice: the better they balanced focus and open 
styles of meditation, the larger the divergence in Aperture they reported (at least for 
participants who practiced the most: more than 24 hours in total). This finding suggests that 
equal familiarity with different states is important for their optimal dissociation, at least at a 
beginner level. Future studies should test this hypothesis more rigorously using a 
longitudinal design with measures collected at baseline. Moreover, although we did not find 
any evidence for desirable responding in this data, we could not rule out the possibility that 
basic semantic priming inflated the reported dissociation in Aperture. Ideally, future training 
programs and experiments should try and avoid semantic overlap between meditation 
instructions and phenomenological dimensions altogether.
Second, self-reported Stability and Clarity had a two-stage dynamic during a series of 4 
consecutive six-minute blocks of meditation, with a statistically significant decrease between 
the second and the last block. We interpret this phenomenon as a fatigue effect, rather than 
an effect of scale misuse. This is based on the observation that this decrease was negatively 
and specifically associated to participants’ Intensity of practicing focus attention. 
Interestingly, this specific association is consistent with the role of concentrative practices in 
Buddhist contemplative traditions. These practices are used as training to stabilize attention 
and other basic qualities such as clarity and effortlessness, before applying them to more 
advanced practices. However, this correlation is not necessarily indicative of an effect of 
training: it may be mediated by an individual trait (e.g. conscientiousness or stamina), 
present even before the meditation training, that could predict both sustained diligence in the 
practice of (the relatively effortful) focus attention, and endurance during meditation sessions 
in the MEG experiment. Regardless, the index of desirable responding was of lesser 
importance in comparison.
Third, we showed that participants’ ratings of the dimension Stability were functionally 
relevant, as they correlated with the variability of their response times. Using Clarity as a 
control dimension, we found that this functional relationship was specific. This finding 
suggests that participants were able to make fine distinctions between two close dimensions 
(this effect was true for both novice and expert practitioners). Regarding novices, we found 
that the more Experience they had at the day of the experiment, the sharper their 
phenomenological acuity. More specifically, we found that Experience in OM, compared to 
other practices, was the best predictor of this acuity. This is in line with the insight potential 
commonly attributed to OM-like practices in Buddhist contexts (Dahl et al. 2015).
Here again, in the absence of longitudinal data, the correlation cannot be treated as direct 
evidence for a causal link involving learning. However, a noteworthy difference with the 
fatigue effect described above is that the practice metric that predicted phenomenological 
acuity (accumulated Experience) is not confounded with participants’ assiduity, because it 
depends as much on Intensity of practice as on the time elapsed between the training 
weekend and the experiment (which was variable and random across the group). 
Considering that Intensity of practice did not predict phenomenological acuity, it appears that 
a likely explanation of these results is that novice participants became more familiar with the 
phenomenal richness of their experience throughout the regular practice of meditation, and 
more proficient in reporting it with specificity and subtlety.
Taken together, our data support the claim that the novices in our study had some 
phenomenological literacy, and were able to report about qualities of their experience in an 
appropriate, meaningful and informative way, even though in some cases we could not 
conclusively rule out the possibility for an additional effect of demand characteristics.
4.3 Training and practice
We have introduced several metrics of practice beyond the oft-used total amount. Although 
these metrics are derived from each other, they are not entirely collinear. In particular, our 
study was able to dissociate Experience (= total amount of practice) from Intensity (= daily 
average of practice) by having a large variability in the time elapsed between the training 
and the MEG experiment, across the novice group (from 27 to 133 days; M = 79, SD = 29). 
Moreover, we showed that these two metrics could be functionally dissociated when 
correlated with subjective ratings or behavioral measures. Such dissociations could point to 
potentially different mechanisms of trait changes brought about by the practice of meditation. 
This observation is consistent with the finding that intensive retreat practice, but not routine 
daily practice is associated with reliable differences in resting respiration rate in experienced 
meditators (Wielgosz et al. 2016). It is also reminiscent of the work of Antonova and 
colleagues (2015) who found that intensity of practice was a better predictor of decreased 
habituation to the acoustic startle reflex than total hours of practice. Future investigation of 
the mechanisms of meditation would benefit from a systematic exploration of various 
practice metrics and their relation to experimental outcomes, for both novice and expert 
practitioners. 
What is the minimum amount of practice that should be required from novice participants for 
the quality of their phenomenological self-reports to match those of experts’, on the 
dimensions explored here? Based on our experimental results, we can provide tentative, 
rough estimates. In our samples of participants, 20 to 40 hours were necessary for novices 
to reach a level of phenomenal specificity comparable to the one of experts; a minimum of 
20 minutes of practice per day on average and a high balance between practices (no more 
than 40% bias) enabled novice participants to differentiate different styles of meditation as 
well as expert practitioners. All these criteria are much higher than what most past cross-
sectional studies of meditation expertise have required from their control participants (Fox et 
al. 2016), but are sufficiently low to be practically accessible and implemented in future 
studies.
4.4 Self-rating scales
We used self-rating scales as tools to help participants translate qualities of their lived 
experience into quantities that can be manipulated, transformed and statistically analyzed 
just like any other numerical measure. Such tools raise vexed issues: for example, how can 
we know that participants use the scales as intended? How can we know that participants, or 
groups of participants, are not construing a given scale in widely different ways? How can 
we even be sure that a given participant is consistent in the way he/she uses a scale over 
time or across experimental conditions, for that matter? To take the example of stability of 
meditation states, we may argue that stability refers to qualitatively different experiences in 
FA and OM. In FA, stability reflects the sustained focus on a given object and therefore the 
stability of mental content. In contrast, OM stability reflects the absence of grasping and as 
such, should not be affected by variations in content.
Our approach of phenomenological training pragmatically addresses the issue of 
interpretation by mapping linguistic definitions of categories onto features of lived experience 
induced and revealed by simple experiential exercises. Performing these exercises in the 
context of a group, under the guidance of an instructor and with the possibility to share their 
understanding and reflect collectively, has the potential to attenuate idiosyncratic 
apprehensions of the phenomenological categories. In addition, concerns related to the 
subjectiveness and incommensurability of self-reported ratings were pragmatically 
addressed using within-subject designs and analyses. 
Even if our results suggest that our methodological approach was effective in detecting 
phenomenological fluctuations, it is worth mentioning the low variance of our self-rating data. 
As an example, 41 out of 50 of our participants used only three values out of the seven 
available in the Stability and Clarity scales; for Clarity, 18 out of 50 participants used only 
two values. This suggests a limitation of our experimental design and/or our training 
program. For instance the relatively short duration of laboratory experiments may not be 
sufficient to experience large fluctuations in these dimensions. Finer rating scales could be 
used as a compensation to increase data variance. Another possibility is that our training 
program was insufficient in developing participants’ fine-grained sensitivity to these scales. 
Further methodological work is needed to address these limitations.   
4.5 Future directions
The role of meditation practice for cognitive science was extensively discussed by Varela et 
al. (1991), becoming a part of their ‘enactive’ approach and then of Varela’s 
neurophenomenological program (Varela 1996). We have provided preliminary evidence that 
meditation experience improves the reliability of self-report data by improving the functional 
specificity of self-reports, and by shielding them from the effect of demand characteristics. 
However, several questions remain open and should be addressed by future research.
First, the impact of training on the quality of first-person data should be more rigorously 
assessed using high-quality, longitudinal, randomized controlled trials. In particular, future 
work should tackle the open question of whether specific phenomenological training such as 
the one we implemented through experiential exercises is required to improve the quality of 
first-person data, or whether meditation practice is sufficient in itself.
In order to evaluate the confounding effect of demand characteristics on our first person-
data, we have used an index of desirable responding. Unfortunately, the validity of the 
questionnaires designed for this purpose, including the one used in this study, has been 
frequently questioned as they are unable to distinguish between genuine personality traits 
and self-enhancement (Paulhus 2002). Special attention should be given to more recent 
efforts to overcome these limitations using alternative and potentially complementary 
approaches (Paulhus et al. 2003; Kwan et al. 2004).
We have provided evidence for reliable first person reports of the phenomenology of 
meditation experience. However, the generalizability of the phenomenal insight provided by 
meditation practice to other, non-meditation-related applications remains disputed (see 
Khalsa et al. 2008 for an example of negative result) and warrant more research.
Rather than provide a standardized, validated, ready for use protocol, our intention was to 
raise methodological concerns pertaining to the quality of control groups used in cross-
sectional studies of meditation, and to argue for the possibility of obtaining informative 
experiential self-reports from adequately trained participants. Although we described in detail 
the protocol that we designed to address these issues, including the experiential exercises 
used for the phenomenological training of the participants, our approach is tailored to the 
specific context of our study, and to a particular phenomenological model of meditation 
among others (Bodhi 2011; Lindahl et al. 2017; Van Dam et al. 2018). Still, we hope that the 
process, rather than the content, will inspire researchers in the field to further explore these 
critical issues.
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Supplementary material
Experiential exercises implemented in the phenomenological training 
protocol
Effort
The dimension of effort was introduced in the context of practicing Focused Attention on the 
sound of a bell. The teacher asked the participants to experience the difference between 
concentrating on a specific sound while preventing the mind from wandering and simply 
recognizing the same sound in the field of awareness (“just listen to the sound”).
Absorption and Meditative Awareness
The difference between being absorbed in a mental phenomenon and being aware of it and 
its nature has been described during teachings throughout all the course of the training 
weekend. In particular, participants have been invited to recognize the switch between 
absorption and awareness that occurs at the very moment they realize their mind has 
wandered away during meditation.
Object Orientation and Aperture
In the context of a guided practice, subjects were asked to focus their attention over a small 
visual object (a flower, a piece of tissue, etc.). Subjects were first asked to concentrate on a 
specific detail of the object, then on the entire object and finally on the entire visual field. This 
exercise was implemented to introduce the concepts of object orientation and aperture with 
a direct experience of the different degree of attentional focus in a given sensory modality, 
and the aperture of the field of awareness. 
Foreground and Background Awareness
During the weekend, participants were guided through a meditation practice using physical 
sensations as support and then shifting the attention over the visual field. Participants could 
experience that, although their attention shifted and changed the main object of focus, 
physical sensations that were previously in the “foreground” could still be experienced in the 
“background”.
Empathy and Compassion
During the second day of the training weekend, subjects were introduced to the processes of 
empathy and compassion with the help of an experiential exercise. The aim of this exercise 
was to help the subject experiencing and understanding the practical meaning of 
compassion, as intended in the Buddhist framework. The access to this understanding and 
experiential testing was fostered by the contrasting experience of empathy, based on the 
process of eidetic reduction and imaginative variation (Husserl 2008).
In practice, two highly emotional pictures, depicting people suffering, were shown to the 
subjects. The pictures were taken from the Internal Affective Picture System database 
(IAPS, Lang et al. 1997) and selected based on negative valence and high arousal. Subjects 
were warned that the pictures were characterised by a strong emotional content. They were 
first asked to look at the picture without any instruction (for about 3 minutes). Subsequently, 
they rested their mind for some minutes and shared their experience of looking at the 
pictures. The teacher acknowledged the subjects’ experiences and introduced the concept of 
empathy and the practice of compassion.
Subjects were asked to look at the pictures again and were guided by the teacher to 
empathize with the sufferer with sentences such as: “the person suffers and you suffer with 
her”. They were also prompted to silently repeat sentences such as: “I feel your sufferance” 
or “Your sufferance is my sufferance”. Moments of “empathy training” were intermixed with 
the practice of open awareness. Subjects were then guided through a practice of 
compassion, using the same pictures as support. This practice followed the form of 
compassion meditation as implemented in the secular program of the Buddhist tradition on 
which the training was based. In this tradition, feelings of compassion are aroused through 
the mental visualization of close and distant suffering beings. Once a felt experience of the 
desire to help is established, the visualization support may be dropped and the practitioner 
simply rests his/her awareness into the compassionate feelings.
Finally, participants were encouraged to share their thoughts and comment on the difference 
between the two experiential exercises and the processes of compassion and empathy, as 
well as their understanding of these processes before and after the exercise.
 
Clarity
The dimension of clarity was introduced and described to the participants at the end of the 
weekend. They were asked to recall how clear their mind was when undergoing the thermal 
pain threshold calibration, compared to trying to use drowsiness as a support for meditation. 
The practice on drowsiness was proposed after lunch on the weekend days. This exercise 
aimed to help novices familiarizing with different degrees of clarity of their mental 
experience, which can partly depend, at least at an early stage of the meditation practice, on 
physiological states. 
Characteristics of novices’ practice
Supplementary Fig. 1 Distributions of the four metrics over the group of novice participants. Participants were 
asked, but not required, to meditate daily for 20 to 30 minutes for the whole duration of the study, which ranged 
from 6 to 23 weeks. (b) Participants favored the practice of Open Monitoring (OM) over Focused Attention (FA), 
and tended to neglect the practice of Compassion (CO). We did not find any effect of type of practice (FA, OM, 
CO) on Session length (one-way repeated measure ANOVA: F(2,80)=1.47, p=.23). In order to determine whether 
individual preferences towards a given practice were present at the outset or emerged over time, we used the 
percentage of weekly practice time dedicated to the preferred practice as a measure of practice bias. Thus 
defined, practice bias ranges from 33.3% (no bias: the participant dedicates the same amount of time to each of 
the three practices) to 100% (full bias: the participant engages in only one practice). Practice bias was found high 
already in the first week after the training weekend (M=59%, SD=16%), and increased linearly over weeks 
(R²adj=.27, p<.016, β=.46, 95% CI [.10, .81]; data not shown). Significance levels: *: p<.05; **: p<.01; ***: p<.001
Supplementary Fig. 2 The amount of daily practice decreased steadily over time (a). A closer look reveals that 
this effect is mostly due to a decline of the Frequency of practice (b) rather than a shortening of Session lengths 
(c). Errors bars are 95% confidence intervals. 
Model selection for self-reported phenomenological effects
Presented below are the detailed results of each of the model selections performed. The 
following information is provided for each model: the variables that compose it, the difference 
between the AICc of the model and the AICc of the best model (ΔIC), the variance explained 
by the model (R²adj), the global level of significance of the model (p), and the p-value of each 
of the model’s terms (main effects and two-way interactions, if any; bold: <.05; italics: <.1; 
n.s.: >.1). In addition, we provide the relative evidence weight, a measure of relative 
importance of each term across the entire model space (Calcagno and de Mazancourt 
2010), comprised between 0 and 1.
model # ΔIC R²adj p BIDR INT EXP FOB FOB:INT FOB:EXP
A1 0 .38 .010 .007 n.s. .09 .007
A2 1.13 .25 .048 .04 n.s. n.s. .053
A3 1.44 .27 .025 .07 n.s. .033
Relative evidence weight .31 .85 .66 .86 .35 .55
Supplementary Table 1 Models selected for the state effect on Aperture
model # ΔIC R²adj p BIDR INT EXP FOB BIDR:INT BIDR:EXP
B1 0 .34 .016 n.s. n.s. .007 .017
B2 0.90 .17 .050 .066 .071
B3 1.69 .45 .010 n.s. n.s. n.s. .004 .003 .056
B4 1.81 .08 .098 .098
B5 1.97 .07 n.s n.s.
Relative evidence weight .60 .66 .34 .74 .36 .10
Supplementary Table 2 Models selected for the fatigue effect
model # ΔIC R²adj p BIDR INTFA INTOM
C1 0 .15 .034 .034
Relative evidence weight .40 .74 .34
Supplementary Table 3 Models selected for the fatigue effect, after differentiating Intensityfocus and Intensityopen.
model # ΔIC R²adj p BIDR INT EXP FOB
D1 0 .19 .023 .023
Relative evidence weight .23 .30 .84 .21
Supplementary Table 4 Model selected for phenomenological specificity, defined as the difference between 
correlations between variability of reaction time on one hand, and Stability and Clarity on the other hand. 
model # ΔIC R²adj p EXPFA EXPOM EXPCO
E1 0 .28 .006 .006
E2 1.22 .29 .012 .005 n.s.
E3 1.48 .35 .011 n.s. .011 .063
Relative evidence weight .44 .91 .49
Supplementary Table 5 Results of post-hoc model selection for phenomenological specificity. 
BIDR Intensity Experience
Intensity 0.431 *[0.034, 0.711]
Experience 0.131[-0.287, 0.508]
0.617 **
[0.284, 0.817]
FOB 0.197[-0.224, 0.556]
-0.061
[-0.454, 0.351]
-0.058
[-0.451, 0.354]
Supplementary Table 6 Pearson cross-correlations between variables of interest. Values between square 
brackets are 95% confidence intervals. Values in bold are significant. Significance levels: *: p<.05; **: p<.01
Supplementary Fig. 3 Johnson-Newman plot of the FOB-by-Experience interaction in model A1 of the state 
effect on Aperture. 
Temporal dynamics of Stability and Clarity
Supplementary Fig. 4 The temporal dynamic of Stability and Clarity ratings in novices across 16 blocks divided 
into 4 sequences (see fig. 2). All ratings were given on a scale ranging from 1 to 7. Error bars = 95% CI.
